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Reclaiming the Right to Food as a Normative
Response to the Global Food Crisis
Smita Narulat
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the number of hungry in the world crossed the one billion
mark,' a dubious milestone that has been attributed in large part to
consecutive food and economic crises.2 Over ninety-eight percent of these
individuals live in the developing world.3 Ironically, a great majority are
involved in food production as small-scale independent food producers or
agricultural laborers.4 These facts and figures signal a definitive blow to
efforts to reduce global hunger and lift the world's poorest from abject and
dehumanizing poverty. They also bring to light the deep imbalance of
power in a fundamentally flawed food system.
Responses to the current crisis have emphasized the responsibility of
states to realize the right to adequate food, and have called for greater
coordination and cooperation between states, civil society organizations,
international institutions, and private sector actors. These calls
t Associate Professor of Clinical Law and Faculty Director, Center for Human Rights and
Global Justice, New York University School of Law. Portions of this Comment rely on the
author's earlier publication, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under
International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 712-713 (2006). The author thanks with
appreciation Sylwia Wewiora for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Based on a projection in FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (FAO), THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: ECONOMIC CRISES -IMPACTS AND LESSONS LEARNED 11 (2009),
available at http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/
wfp209430.pdf.
2. Td. at 9, 13-30.
3. Id. at 11. Of the estimated 1.02 billion, only 15 million live in developed countries.
4. The Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food, Olivier De Schutter: Agribusiness and the Right to Food, if 8, 10-12, delivered at the 13th
Session of the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33 (Dec. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20100305-a-hrc-13-
33_agribusiness-en.pdf.
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conspicuously fail to attribute specific obligations or responsibilities to
global actors that have had a profound and often devastating impact on the
right to food, and whose policies and practices were instrumental in
facilitating the current food crisis.5
Under economic globalization, the power exerted by global actors such
as dominant states, international financial institutions (IFIs), and
transnational corporations (TNCs), has wreaked havoc on the global food
system and has made it increasingly difficult for weaker states to assert full
control over policies that are central to their ability to fulfill the right to
food. Yet these actors are not given equal consideration in international
policy prescriptions, or under international law.
This Comment explores both the urgency and paucity of the "right to
food" as a legal and normative framework for addressing the current food
crisis. It begins with an articulation of the contours and limits of the right to
food under international human rights law, which organizes itself around
the obligations of states to individuals in their jurisdiction. It then explores
how powerful states, IFIs, and TNCs affect the right to food abroad both
directly and indirectly by impeding the ability of states to fulfill their
economic and social rights obligations. The Comment concludes by
addressing particular doctrinal challenges that are essential to reclaiming
the right to food as a relevant normative framework under economic
globalization.
II. THE RIGHT TO FOOD UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTOURS AND LIMITS
The right to food has been part of the international human rights
regime since its inception. The right first found expression in Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states that
"[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food . . . ."6 The right
was subsequently codified by Article 11 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which encompasses two
separate but related norms: the right to adequate food (Article 11(1)) and
the right to be free from hunger (article 11(2)).7
5. See, e.g., Statement of the Madrid High-Level Meeting on Food Security for All, Madrid,
Spain, Jan. 27, 2009, available at http://www.donorplatform.org/component/
option,com docman/task,doc-download/gid,891 (emphasizing the responsibility of States to
realize the right to adequate food and calling for a global partnership of governments, civil
society organizations, business, donors, and international agencies to deal with food
insecurity).
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25(1), G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
7. Philip Alston, International Lawo and the Hunan Right to Food, in THE RIGHT To FOOD 9,29
(Philip Alston & Katarina Tomasevski eds., 1984). Article 11 of the ICESCR reads:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the
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The right to adequate food is a "relative" standard. In contrast, the
right to be free from hunger is "absolute." 8 As a minimum core obligation,
States Parties must act immediately "to mitigate and alleviate hunger ...
even in times of natural or other disasters." 9 The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)10 has concluded that the "core content"
of the right to adequate food implies ensuring:
The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to
satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse
substances, and acceptable within a given culture;
The accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and
that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights."
While the ICESCR allows for "progressive realization" of the rights
contained therein, there are two obligations that apply fully and
immediately to all economic, social, and cultural rights irrespective of the
availability of resources: the obligation to ensure non-discrimination and
essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take,
individually and through international co-operation, the measures,
including specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and
distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific
knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of
nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such
a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization
of natural resources;
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and
food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of
world food supplies in relation to need.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cescr.pdf.
8. THE RIGHT TO FOOD: GUIDE THROUGH APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW xviii (Katarina
Tomasevski ed., 1987).
9. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights
(CESCR), General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5
(May 12, 1999), [hereinafter General Comment No. 12] available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/ (Symbol)/3d02758c707031 d58025677f003 b73b9?Opendocument.
10. The CESCR, established by virtue of ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, is empowered to carry
out the monitoring functions assigned to the ECOSOC in order to ensure states' compliance
with the ICESCR. U.N. ECOSOC Res. 1985/17, Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Review of the Composition, Organization and Administrative Arrangements of the
Sessional Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (May 28, 1985), available at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/ECOSOC/resolutions/E-RES-1985-17.doc.
11. General Comment No. 12, supra note 9, 8.
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
the obligation "to take steps" toward the realization of these rights.12
In his study on the right to adequate food as a human right, Asbjorn
Eide developed a three-level typology of states' duties, which is now a
widely used framework for analyzing states' human rights obligations
generally.13 These are: the duty to respect, the duty to protect, and the duty
to fulfill or facilitate human rights.14 The duty to respect the right to food is
essentially a duty of non-interference with existing access to adequate food.
It requires States Parties to refrain from measures that prevent such access.
The duty to protect the right to food requires States Parties "to ensure that
enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to
adequate food."1 s The duty to fulfill the right to food is a positive obligation
that the CESCR has interpreted to include the duty to facilitate and to
provide. The duty to facilitate implies that
the State must pro-actively engage in activities intended to
strengthen people's access to and utilization of resources and
means to ensure their livelihood, including food security . . . .
Whenever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond
their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at
their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right
directly.16
As articulated above, the normative content of the right to food, and
the ensuing obligations of states to those within their territory or
jurisdiction, enjoys far greater clarity than when the right was first codified
under international human rights law. The recent food and economic crises
have also motivated calls for states to put in place appropriate legislation,
strategies, and institutional frameworks to progressively realize the right to
adequate food,17 to pursue a rights-based approach to tackling food
insecurity, and to protect vulnerable populations from the volatility of food
12. ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature
of States Parties' Obligations, 5th Sess., 1-2, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424cl2563ed0052b664?Opendo
cument; ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20: Non-
Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2,
2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/gc/E.C.12.GC.20.doc.
13. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The New
Tnternational Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights: Report on the Right to Adequate
Food as a Human Right, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987) (submitted by Asbjorn
Eide).
14. Id. at 112-14.
15. General Comment No. 12, supra note 9, 15.
16. Id.
17. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Background Note: Analysis of the World Food
Crisis by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, § 1.2, presented to the
Human Rights Council (May 2, 2008), available at http://www.srfood.org/images/stories
/pdf/otherdocuments/1-srrtfnoteglobalfoodcrisis-2-5-08.pdf.
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prices on international markets.18
Indeed, states occupy a central and critical role in ensuring the right to
food and should discharge these obligations in a transparent, accountable,
and non-discriminatory manner that ensures the participation of those
most affected. 19 Holding these domestic actors accountable is of
fundamental importance-not least because it is a means of enabling
societies to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources between the
country's wealthy elite and majority poor.
Equally important, and far less considered, is the need to hold global
actors accountable for the impact of their policies and practices on the right
to food. As described below, World Trade Organization- (WTO) led trade
liberalization, the inability of host states to regulate effectively the power of
TNCs, and burdensome IFI-imposed debt servicing obligations directly
affect the right to food and additionally restrict the capacity of states to
fashion the very arrangements that are contemplated by the ICESCR and
related international instruments.20
III. How GLOBAL ACTORS AFFECT THE RIGHT TO FOOD
Between 2007 and 2008, soaring food prices led to a global food crisis
that intensified an already rising trend in world hunger,21 and unleashed
food-related social unrest in dozens of countries. 22 A toxic combination of
factors led to this crisis in food supply and prices, including insufficient
investments in agriculture, climate change, higher fuel costs, the diversion
of food crops to biofuels, speculative investment, and an increased demand
for more resource-intensive food in emerging market countries.23 Across
the globe, but especially in developing countries, the current economic
crisis has kept food prices artificially inflated, has decreased food imports,
and has led to a loss of income and employment.24 The Intergovernmental
18. See, e.g., FAO, supra note 1; World Summit on Food Security, Nov. 16-18, 2009,
Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, 6, WSFS 2009/2 (Nov. 18, 2009) [hereinafter
Declaration of the World Food Summit on Food SecurityV], available at
ftp:/ /ftp.fao.org/ docrep/fao/Meeting/018/k6050e.pdf. Higher food prices have hurt the
poorest the most, and among the poor, have had a particularly devastating impact on women
and the landless. FAO, supra note 1, at 10. States have established social safety nets to protect
vulnerable populations. Id. at 41.
19. See U.N. Interagency Workshop on a Human Rights Based Approach in the Context of
U.N. Reform, May 2-3, 2003, The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation:
Towards a Common Understanding Among the UN Agencies, available at
http:/ / www.crin.org/ docs/ resources/ publications/hrbap/ HR common understanding.do.
20. See, e.g., FAO, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES TO SUPPORT THE PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF
THE RIGHT To ADEQUATE FOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY (2004), available
at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825e00.htm.
21. Hunger was on the rise even before the current crises, and has been on the rise since
the late 1990s. FAO, supra note 1, at 8.
22. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 17, § 2.1.
23. Id. § 2.2; see also Bank Information Center, Amid Food Riots and Shaken Governments IFIs
Scramble to Develop a Coherent Response, May 9, 2008,
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3763.aspx.
24. FAO, supra note 1, at 8-10.
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Panel on Climate Change expects that continuing climate change patterns,
which have already devastated agricultural production in developing
countries through droughts and unpredictable weather patterns, will
continue to undermine food security, leading to increased malnutrition,
fewer opportunities for poverty reduction, and an even greater reliance on
food imports from developed countries.25
The roots of the current crisis run deep and implicate a number of
global actors. For decades, IFIs such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) have actively promoted macroeconomic reforms in the Global South
that have facilitated the expansion of TNCs and the promotion of free
trade. The IMF has also conditioned loans to developing countries on
reductions in social spending and retooling production to service
international markets, sometimes at great costs to social welfare and
domestic markets. 26 A combination of these processes, some of which are
detailed below, has contributed to the state of food insecurity in the world
today, and has simultaneously undermined the ability of weaker states to
assert control over policies that are central to their ability to fulfill the right
to food.
IFIs have long been scrutinized for their role in perpetuating food
insecurity. Powerful members of the IMF, for example, were charged with
dictating the economic policies of weaker states through structural
adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s that conditioned loans on the
forced liberalization of developing country markets.27 Collectively, these
policies have had a significant impact on the social and economic rights of
populations in borrowing countries, including the right to food.28
Countries under structural adjustment were often required to cut
government spending on social programs, including social services to feed
poor and hungry populations, remove food subsidies, often resulting in
substantial price hikes, and remove subsidies from agricultural inputs,
such as fertilizer and pesticides, resulting in an increase in input prices and
decrease in their use for subsistence crop production. Structural adjustment
programs also encouraged countries to focus on the production and export
of "cash crops" while foregoing the production of basic food crops.29 In the
aggregate, the net effect of structural adjustment in Africa and in countries
in other regions was greater food insecurity, impoverishment, and
marginalization of local communities. 0
25. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008:
FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 90 (2008), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/chapters.
26. Beth Lyon, Discourse in Development: A Post-Colonial "Agenda" for the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 535, 556
(2002).
27. JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 9 (2003).
28. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The International Monetary Fund and the Right to Food, 30 How.
L.J. 473 (1987); SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2001).
29. Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under Tnternational
Lawo, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 712-713 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
30. Id. at 714.
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Following nearly two decades of economic upheavals in borrowing
countries, both the World Bank and IMF undertook to reform IFI
conditionality and searched for more effective approaches to tackling
poverty.31 Even with these reforms, critics charge that borrowing countries
are still required to emphasize macroeconomic considerations, fiscal
reform, and privatization, without adequately addressing the impact of
these policies on poverty reduction.32 Like any bank, the IMF should, in
principle, be allowed to impose conditions on borrowers that make it more
likely that the loan will be repaid. But critics point out that the
conditionality imposed by the IMF, and in some cases the World Bank,
may reduce the likelihood of repayment.3 Moreover, in many instances,
the problem is not that rulers of borrowing governments have no control
vis-A-vis the IMF, but rather that they have no accountability to their own
citizens, allowing them to implement only those reforms that favor
members of the ruling elite.34
International trade liberalization under the WTO regime has also
affected food security. The WTO's Agreement on Agriculture, for instance,
imposes several restrictions on WTO members in favor of trade
liberalization in agriculture.3 First, under the premise of increasing market
access for agricultural products, members must replace quantitative
restrictions with tariffs, which they are subsequently bound to reduce. But
a lack of enforcement of this subsequent tariff reduction has led to non-
compliance and has harmed developing countries seeking viable markets,
increasing their dependence on food imports.36 Second, members must
refrain from introducing new forms of domestic support for agricultural
production and must reduce current levels of support by certain base
percentages. Such an arrangement favors developed countries that already
had stable support systems that can be reduced to still-functional levels or
that consist of support mechanisms beyond the scope of the Agreement on
Agriculture) 7 And third, members must reduce existing export subsidies
and refrain from introducing new export subsidies. This again favors
developed countries that already had export subsidies in place. As a result,
31. Id. at 715-16.
32. Independent Expert on the effects of structural adjustment policies and foreign debt
on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights,
The Highly Indebted Countries (HfPC) Tnitiative: A Human Rights Assessment of the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), if 24-30, presented at the 57th Session of the Commission on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/56 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/d3b34
8546ad5fb91c1256a110056aca4/ $FILE/ G0110184.pdf.
33. STIGLITZ, supra note 27, at 44-46.
34. NICHOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT
CRISIS, 1979-1999 48 (2001).
35. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, Olivier De Schutter, Addendum: Mission to the World Trade Organization, 14, presented to
the 10th Session of the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2 (Feb. 4, 2009),
available at http://www.srfood.org/ images/ stories/ pdf/ officialreports/ or3-hrc-10-5-add2-
advancededitedversion-en.pdf.
36. Id. 1 10, 23.
37. Id. 11, 12.
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cheap subsidized products continue to flood domestic markets, displacing
local production.38 Ultimately, the disparate levels of protection and
liberalization within developing and developed countries makes illusory
the notion of a "level playing field," 39 and makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for developing countries to minimize the negative effects of
agricultural trade while maximizing its benefits. 40
The liberalization of trade and the privatization and deregulation of
economies have substantially reduced the state's influence over the daily
economic lives of its citizens. The so-called "decline of the nation-state" has
been accompanied by the rise of another powerful actor - the TNC.41 TNCs
are increasingly playing a role in determining the level of food security for
populations around the world. As IFI-influenced national economic
policies encourage the replacement of diverse crops intended for local
consumption with commercial crops intended for export, investment in the
agricultural sector by TNCs has, in many instances, had a negative impact
on food production.42 The right to food is also threatened by environmental
disasters and water pollution caused by TNCs. In their role as employers,
TNCs can also affect the right to food when they fail to pay their workers
enough to purchase sufficient food for their families.43
Exacerbating these problems is the fact that, in many instances,
developing country governments and their ruling elites actually benefit
from TNCs' unregulated behavior to the detriment of the countries' poorer
populations. 44 Privileges accorded to TNCs are also often the result of
government corruption and acceptance of bribes by government officials. 45
Moreover, TNCs are not motivated by the same interests as the state. Their
fiduciary duty to their shareholders arguably puts profit-seeking ahead of
the interests of the local communities in which they operate. A key
example, which is also of great relevance to the current food crisis, is the
immense impact that TNCs have on the production, trade, processing,
marketing, and retailing of food. By virtue of their economic influence and
considerable bargaining power, TNCs can, for example, determine the
types of food produced, the technologies associated with that production,
and the prices at which such resources are made available to local sectors.
38. Id. 13.
39. Id. 17.
40. Id. 14.
41. Menno T. Kammainga, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights
Abuses: A Challenge for the EC, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 553 (Philip Alston et al. eds.,
1999).
42. JOHN MADELEY, BIG BUSINESS, POOR PEOPLES: THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON THE WORLD'S POOR 39 (2d ed. 2008).
43. Narula, supra note 29, at 722.
44. According to one study, "foreign investment dependence benefits the elite segments of
the income-earning population over the poorer eighty percent." Linda Beer & Terry Boswell,
The Resilience of Dependency Effects in Explaining Income Inequality in the Global Economiy: A
Cross-National Analysis, 1975-1995, 8 J. WORLD-SYS. RES. 30, 52 (2002), available at
http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol8/numberl/pdf/jwsr-v8n1-beerboswell.pdf.
45. STIGLITZ, supra note 27, at 71-72.
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Increasingly, agribusiness TNCs-including commodity traderS46 and
retailerS47 - have exerted power in ways that undermine the right to food.48
With increasing consolidation in the agribusiness industry, TNCs have also
been able to exert control over prices of both agricultural inputs and
outputs. High prices for chemical pesticides, fertilizers, and seeds
distributed by large TNCs such as Monsanto have raised the cost of
agricultural production while the prices paid to farmers for their produce
have, in many cases, stagnated or declined; as a result, farmers in
developing countries often lose money on the sale of their crops and can
barely afford to feed their own families.49
IFI-imposed structural adjustment programs and the liberalization of
trade in agricultural products have turned a number of food-exporting
developing countries into net food-importers over the past twenty years.50
Low income net food-importing countries were the hardest hit by soaring
food prices on the international market.51 The rising cost of agricultural
inputs and climate change have also had a dramatic and negative impact
on agricultural production.52 Insufficient investments in agriculture and the
accompanying decline in agricultural production are cited as major causal
factors of the food crisis. For years, agriculture has failed to attract foreign
direct investment and, as noted above, has been neglected and even
undermined by IFI policies.s3
In response to the recent food crisis, international actors and inter-
governmental declarations are now emphasizing the need for greater
46. BLOOM ET AL., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW STUDENTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD, Part IV.B (2009), available at
http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/TNCsandRTF.pdf.
47. Id. at Part V.B.
48. See generally Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 4.
49. ACTIONAID INT'L, POWER HUNGRY: SIx REASONS TO REGULATE GLOBAL FOOD
CORPORATIONS 11-17 (2005), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/
content/documents/power hungry.pdf; Peter O'Driscoll, Part of the Problem: Trade,
Transnational Corporations, and Hunger, CTR. Focus, Mar. 2005,
http://globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/03problem.pdf; see also VANDANA SHIVA, STOLEN
HARVEST: THE HIJACKING OF THE GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY (2000); BLOOM ET AL., supra note 46,
Parts III.A-B. Due to increasing concentration in food production and distribution chains,
bargaining power has heavily shifted towards commodity buyers, who use their position to
buy crops at artificially low prices while keeping food prices high; likewise, a lack of collective
bargaining power leaves agricultural workers vulnerable to labor violations. Special
Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 4, 8, 10-12.
50. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., TACKLING THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS, U.N. (June
2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/presspb20081_en.pdf; Special Rapporteur
on the right to food, supra note 17, § 2.2. A great number of African countries fall under this
vulnerable category. Id.
51. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 50.
52. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 17, § 2.2.
53. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of
Core Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, § 1, presented to the Human
Rights Council of the General Assembly, (June 6, 2009), available at
http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20090611_large-scale-land-
acquisitions en.pdf.; see also Bank Information Center, supra note 23 (stating that IFIs such as
the World Bank and IMF had since 1970 promoted the development of export economies to
the detriment of investment in agriculture).
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investments in agriculture as a means of fighting hunger and driving
economic growth and poverty reduction.54 In 2008, for example, the World
Bank announced the "New Deal for Global Food Policy" which combines
emergency funding with long-term lending to spur agricultural
productivity.55 The Bank has also encouraged foreign investment in
agricultural production. Indeed, the current crises have intensified the
global trend of large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries for
outsourced agricultural production by state and private investors seeking
both food security and financial returns.56 Additionally, the continued
demand for biofuel, despite recent declines in oil prices, has contributed to
a boom in large-scale land acquisition for biofuel production.57 The
financial industry-backed by IFIs such as the World Bank, the
International Finance Corporation, and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development-now also sees farmland as a safe
investment.ss
For countries acquiring land abroad to grow staple foods, such
investments reduce reliance on international markets and increase food
security for investor country populations. These investments also have the
potential to reduce poverty in host states - they can, for example, generate
employment, encourage the transfer of technology, improve local
producers' access to markets, and increase public revenues from taxation
and export duties.59 While the situation seems mutually beneficial, the
focus of such investments is less on agricultural or rural development and
more on agribusiness development in host developing countries.60 In many
cases, foreign investors acquire a country's most fertile and profitable land
54. A number of major regional and international meetings resulted in commitments to
increased support for agriculture. See Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, supra
note 18, 6.
55. Bank Information Center, supra note 23. The World Bank Group is projected to
increase agriculture funding from $4.1 billion in FY 2006-2008 to between $6.2 billion and $8.3
billion in FY 2010-2012. THE WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTING AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT,
WORLD BANK GROUP AGRICULTURE ACTION PLAN: FY 2010-2012, 3 (2009), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/Agriculture Action Plan web.pdf;
The World Bank, Agriculture and Food Security Initiative Gains Momentum at G20, World Bank-
TMF meetings, Oct. 21, 2009, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/
0,,contentMDK:22359784~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html.
56. GRAIN INTERNATIONAL, SEIZED! THE 2008 LAND GRAB FOR FOOD AND FINANCIAL
SECURITY 2 (2008), available at http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=212; see also Vera Songwe
& Klaus Deininger, Foreign Tnvestment in Agricultural Production: Opportunities and Challenges,
45 THE WORLD BANK: AGRIC. & RURAL DEV. NOTES: LAND POL'Y & ADMIN. 1 (Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.landcoalition.org/pdf/08 note45.pdf; LORENZO COTULA ET AL., FAO,
LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY? AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS IN AFRICA 15 (2009), available at
http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/land grab.pdf. Countries such as China, India, and Gulf
States are no longer relying on the market to provide adequate amounts of food for their
citizens, and are instead investing in agricultural production around the world. GRAIN
INTERNATIONAL, supra, at 3. The food industry, for its part, is shifting away from the leasing
of, for example, agricultural plants to outright control over farmland itself. Id. at 7-9.
57. COTULA ET AL., supra note 56, at 54-56.
58. GRAIN INTERNATIONAL, supra note 56, at 7-9.
59. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 53, § 1.
60. GRAIN INTERNATIONAL, supra note 56, at 6, 10.
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in deals that remit few benefits to the local population, thereby
undermining food security and sovereignty in the host country.61 The
diminished ability of local producers to procure cultivable land, in turn,
effectively negates the purported benefits of increased market access. 62
Though taxation and export duties may serve as a source of revenue for the
host state, the transfer of land to foreign investors -many of whom export
all that they reap -induces greater reliance on food imports.63 The lack of
consultation with local communities and the impact on local land rights
have also been raised as concerns, 64 frustrating the aim of satisfying local
employment needs and stripping individuals, including those from
indigenous populations,65 of land. The attendant problems of land
acquisition are made more acute by the rising demand for biofuel
production,66 which also has broader implications for food security when
arable land is diverted from food to fuel production.67 The possible benefits
of large-scale land acquisition are additionally subverted by the
unpredictability of speculative investment, one of the causes of the recent
food crisis.68
The global power exerted by dominant states, TNCs, and IFIs has led
to the entrenchment of policies and practices that have significantly
undermined the right to food. Responses to the current food crisis, led in
part by these same actors, may also exacerbate already worrisome trends in
food production and food security. The remainder of this Comment
examines the relevance of the right to food as a normative framework for
reining in these actors and their impact on the international food system.
61. Id at 9.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 9-10; see also COTULA ET AL., supra note 56, at 68, 70-74 (noting many countries'
weak community consultation requirements and stating that "[tihere is a general sense among
observers that negotiations and agreements occur behind closed doors.").
65. See Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 53, at 7 (raising the issue of
foreign entities evicting indigenous populations from land that may not be readily apparent
as unavailable).
66. Id. at 4, 9.
67. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE FOR
DEVELOPMENT 8, 70-71 (2007) (noting that competition between food and fuel production
exists and observing that demand for agricultural feedstocks for biofuel production induces
supply shocks in food items that contribute to increasing global food prices), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR 00 book.pdf; see also
FAO ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT THAT RESPECTS RIGHTS,
LIVELIHOODS AND RESOURCES (2010), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/214574-
1111138388661/22453321/PrinciplesExtended.pdf (articulating principles to guard against
the potential negative impacts of large-scale land acquisitions, including respect for land and
resource rights, ensuring food security, transparency, and good governance, consultation with
and participation of those materially affected, and responsible agro-enterprise investing that
respects the rule of law and that is socially and environmentally sustainable).
68. Songwe & Deininger, supra note 56, at 2.
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IV. RECLAIMING THE RIGHT TO FOOD AS A RELEVANT NORMATIVE
FRAMEWORK
Under the ICESCR, States Parties are obligated to take steps to
progressively achieve the full realization of the right to food for those
within their territory or under their jurisdiction. Implicit in this state-
centric approach is the rationale that human rights are the by-product of
relationships between governments and the individuals they govern,
rather than relationships between global actors and individuals worldwide
whose rights are affected by their actions.
As shown above, the right to food is being undermined on an
unprecedented scale and across borders by a variety of global actors, none
of whom are held to account for the impact of their individual or collective
actions. The existing human rights legal framework is ill-equipped to deal
with these actors and the effects of their policies abroad: it limits states'
obligations to respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the rights of individuals
in their territory or under their jurisdiction, and it does not directly address
the obligations of IFIs and TNCs. These jurisdictional and state-centric
constraints have, to date, undermined effective implementation of the right
to food and lead to two doctrinal challenges that are critical to reclaiming
the relevance of the right to food as a normative framework in an era of
economic globalization. These are: 1) conceptualizing the extraterritorial
application of states' human rights obligations vis-A-vis economic, social
and cultural (ESC) rights; and 2) establishing means by which IFIs and
TNCs may be held accountable via their relationship to powerful states.
With regard to the first challenge, the language of international
cooperation, as found in ICESCR 2(1) on States' Parties obligations,69 and
also in Article 11 on the right to food,70 has been read to assert that states
have obligations that extend beyond their territory or jurisdiction. In its
own guidance on the interpretation of the obligation of international
cooperation, the CESCR provides that "States parties should take steps to
respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, to protect that
right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary aid when
required."71 In international agreements, where relevant, States Parties
should ensure that the right to adequate food is given due attention.72 The
Committee looks to the "spirit" of Article 56 of the Charter of the United
Nations,73 specific provisions contained in Articles 11, 21, and 2374 of the
69. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR reads: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures." ICESCR,
supra note 7, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
70. See id. art. 11(1)-(2).
71. General Comment No. 12, supra note 9, 36.
72. Il. 37.
73. U.N. Charter art. 56, para. 1.
74. ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 23 (stating that international action to achieve the rights
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ICESCR, and the Rome Declaration of the World Food Summit75 in
reaching its conclusions. 76
Though the obligation of international cooperation may broaden the
extraterritorial application of the ICESCR, the obligation itself is ill-defined.
Taken to its extreme, the obligation could be interpreted as a general call
for the transfer of resources and wealth from rich states to poor states. The
articulation of the obligation in a manner that includes a duty to fulfill
social and economic rights in other countries may also meet with a great
deal of political resistance by states that do not wish to cast their aid-giving
in terms of legal obligation. Focusing too much on international food aid
may also counterproductively undermine the right to food, as food aid can
create new dependencies, disrupt local markets, and affect commercial
trade patterns.77
A more fruitful approach, that is also attuned to the deep imbalance of
power inherent in the processes described above, would emphasize the
obligations to respect and protect the right to food extraterritorially, while
focusing on the vehicles through which many extraterritorial violations
occur-namely, IFIs and TNCs. Ensuring that States Parties' extra-
territorial obligations extend to their relationships with these actors may be
the most effective means of reclaiming the right to food as a relevant
normative and legal framework.
V. ADDRESSING IMBALANCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD SYSTEM: NEXT
STEPS
As explored above, international human rights law does not directly
address the obligations of IFIs and TNCs. These actors can, however, be
held indirectly accountable via powerful states. IFIs (such as the World
Bank and the IMF) are essentially multi-state actors; they are comprised of
member states. Powerful member states often dictate economic policies in
weaker countries that undermine the right to food. Many of these member
states have also ratified the ICESCR, and can and should be required to
take into account their international human rights treaty obligations when
participating in IFIs; this includes a duty to ensure that IFI policies respect
and protect the right to food.
International human rights law additionally obligates states to regulate
included in the ICESCR includes conventions, recommendations, technical assistance, and
regional meetings).
75. See WORLD FOOD SUMMIT, ROME DECLARATION ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY (Nov. 13,
1996), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.HTM.
76. General Cornrnent No. 12, supra note 9, 36, 37; see also General Cornrnent 3, supra note
12, 4 (stating that international obligations should be seen in connection with Articles 1(3),
55, and 56 of the U.N. Charter).
77. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, The Role of Development Cooperation and Food
Aid in Realizing the Right to Adequate Food: Moving Fron Charity to Obligation, 3, presented to
the 10th Session of the Hurnan Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/5 (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http:/ / www.srfood.org/ images/ stories/pdf/ officialreports/ or4-a-hrc-10-5-advanced-edited-
version.pdf.
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the behavior of non-state actors, whether individuals or corporations,
through the duty to protect,78 though such responsibility normally attaches
to the host state. There are, of course, many sound reasons to expect the
host state to regulate TNC activity. The host state has primary
responsibility for the protection of human rights in its territory or under its
jurisdiction, the host state negotiates the terms under which TNCs can
operate in the country, and the host state's administrative and judicial
machinery can provide a regulatory framework. Economic arrangements
between a TNC and the host state may, however, restrict the host state's
ability to perform its duties. 79
As noted above, the need to hold domestic actors accountable for their
human rights obligations remains paramount, and under international law,
these obligations are quite clear. What remains unclear is the responsibility
of the home states that play a considerable role in financing and fashioning
an advantageous and deregulated framework for TNCs' operations abroad.
Without insurance, TNC risks may not be covered; without capital,
they may not be able to finance their ventures abroad; without trade
agreements, they may not be able to do business abroad; and without
the home states' political muscle, they may not enjoy such a high
degree of deregulation or profit from contracts that are tilted heavily in
their favor.80
While home states negotiate an advantageous framework and provide
other essential services critical to the operation of TNCs abroad, they are
not held responsible for the consequences of TNC activities. Yet under the
principle of due diligence, as shaped and defined under international law
jurisprudence, states are obligated to make a good-faith effort to prevent
foreseeable violations by non-state actors over whom they are able to exert
some degree of authority.81 Home states can and should therefore be
required to regulate the activities of TNCs that enjoy the state's political
and economic backing.
I have elsewhere reconciled the above assertions with the more
conservative articulations of state responsibility under international law,
78. See The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a
Framework for Business and Hunan Rights, 9, presented to the 8th Session of the Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008), available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf (noting "the State duty to protect against human
rights abuses by third parties, including business; the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights; and the need for more effective access to remedies.").
79. One example is the "stability" clause that is common to agreements between foreign
investors and the host state, which provides that the state will not impose further regulations
on the investor that could diminish the profitability of the investment. See Olivier De Schutter,
Transnational Corporations as Instruments of Human Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 414-16 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson
eds., 2005).
80. Narula, supra note 29, at 764.
81. Id. at 764-66.
416 [Vol. 13
Reclaiming the Right to Food
concluding that the degree of influence and control exerted by powerful
states over TNCs and IFIs, respectively, can trigger obligations to regulate
the activities of these actors. 82 A serious engagement with these obligations
would deliver significant policy results. In the context of IFI policies,
respecting and protecting the right to food would mean giving states the
policy space they need to fashion appropriate measures and tools to
progressively realize the right to food. Soaring food insecurity resulting
from successive food and economic crises underscores the need for robust
new policies, as well as the space for struggling economies to implement
them.
Experts have, for example, called for increased investments in
sustainable agriculture in developing countries83 and greater protections
for smallholder farming, including increasing market access and
diversifying market concentration to allow smallholders to maintain food
security. 84 Agricultural workers, who ironically are among the most food
insecure, must also be afforded social protections, especially collective
bargaining rights.8 Relevant IFI policies can and should be shaped to
support these calls, rather than undermine them. Here, powerful member
states can play a critical and influential role, and in so doing, can uphold
their obligation to respect and protect the right to food abroad.
In their dealings with the IMF, powerful states can uphold their
obligations by shifting from a standardized and process-oriented approach
to a tailored outcomes-oriented approach. Critics have charged that the
IMF does not undertake a differential diagnosis specific to country
conditions and instead offers standardized advice relating to budget cuts,
trade liberalization, and privatization of state-owned enterprises, without
due regard to the specific context. The IMF has, for example, overlooked
problems related to climate, disease, cultural conditions, and agronomy.86
A country's performance is also often judged by whether or not it carries
out IFI advice and not by whether or not it has achieved particular
development objectives, such as poverty reduction.87
In the context of the WTO, the multilateral trading system must also
enable states to pursue policies aimed at realizing the right to food and
must refrain from imposing obligations that undermine this paramount
goal. Powerful states could, for example, support policies that help, or at
the very least do not harm, developing countries with weakened
agricultural sectors. The ongoing Doha Round negotiations on agricultural
reform in trade policy-which continue to stall around discussions of the
82. Id. at 739-66.
83. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 17, § 2.3(b); Declaration of the World
Summit on Food Security, supra note 18, 7.3, 17, 26.
84. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 4, 29-36; Declaration of the World
Summit on Food Security, supra note 18, 19.
85. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 4, 13-20.
86. JEFFREY SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 79-80
(2005).
87. Id. at 80.
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trade-distorting impacts of developed country support to farmers88 -
present an opportunity to truly level the playing field for developing
countries and provide them with greater flexibility to target smallholders,
promote rural development, and ensure that food supplies remain stable.89
Turning to TNCs, one means of satisfying the due diligence obligation
described above is for home states to regulate corporate activity through
the enactment of domestic legislation with extraterritorial reach. The
proposed legislation could, for example, provide guidelines on respecting
and protecting the right to food; include requirements to institute and
adhere to codes of conduct; incorporate environmental and labor
protections; and sanction violations of these standards with both civil and
criminal penalties. To ensure effectiveness, the legislation could also allow
for private actions.90
The Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, which so far remain voluntary,
could serve as a model for an enforceable regulatory framework, since they
call on enterprises to "respect the human rights of those affected by their
activities consistent with the host government's international obligations
and commitments." 91 The Guidelines' broad focus on labor laws,
environmental protections, combating bribery, protecting consumer
interests, issues related to competition and taxation, and the development
of science and technology could also cover the variety of ways in which
TNCs affect the right to food.
Considering the highly concentrated nature of the international
agribusiness economy, powerful home states could also regulate TNCs
through the enactment of stricter domestic and international antitrust
legislation.92 Instead of focusing on the power of sellers -farmers, in this
instance-home states should recognize and critically investigate buyer, or
agribusiness TNC, power.93 Additionally, farmers, or civil society
organizations acting on their behalf,94 could be granted private rights of
action for antitrust claims.95 Finally, home states should broaden the
88. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 35, 16.
89. See WORLD TRADE ORG., AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS: THE ISSUES AND WHERE WE ARE
Now 61-67 (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric-e/
agnegs bkgrnd e.pdf. Income increases, though, are dependent on the very source of food
insecurity: trade liberalization.
90. One suggested model for such a regulatory framework, at least in the United States, is
a modified version of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), which prohibits
foreign bribery and creates record-keeping and accounting requirements for corporations. See
Erin L. Borg, Note, Sharing the Blame for September Eleventh: The Case for a New Law to Regulate
the Activities of American Corporations Abroad, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 607, 639-42 (2003).
The FCPA provides civil and criminal penalties for violators but does not provide a private
right of action. Id.
91. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 14 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
92. BLOOM ET AL., supra note 46, at 59.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 60 (citing ACTIONAID INT'L, supra note 49).
95. Il.
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jurisdictional authority of their antitrust laws 96 and encourage the adoption
of an international competition policy, with a possible independent
investigatory body.97
Creating the regulatory frameworks envisioned above may also have
costs for the host state. Prescriptions for reining in TNC behavior in host
countries regularly come up against the caution that such regulations
should not act as a disincentive for the very foreign direct investment that
is needed to support economic growth. Though foreign direct investment
may help alleviate poverty, it does so more effectively if grounded in
positive corporate conduct. Providing a uniformly-enforced regulatory
framework may actually encourage foreign investment in developing
countries by leveling the business playing field for ethical corporations. 98
Some Western companies have begun to recognize the merits of operating
under enforceable standards that apply to all their competitors, rather than
voluntary standards that only really affect companies with prominent
public profiles.99 Involving the home state in both normative and practical
terms in such regulations could provide an effective means of protecting
the right to food where accountability gaps exist.
And finally, it is critical that policy responses to the current crises do
not perpetuate the very food insecurity they seek to alleviate. Here, calls
for greater investments in agriculture should not give way to problematic
large-scale land acquisitions by foreign investors that yield few returns to
host populations. Negotiations leading to such investments should be
conducted with transparency and with the participation of affected
communities.100 States should protect the land use rights of local
communities,101 negotiate investments that guarantee that local
populations benefit from revenues generated by the investment,102 and
ensure that agreements tend to their development 03 and employment
needs.104 For investments in net food-importing countries in particular, the
agreement should specify that a minimum percentage of the crops
produced must be sold at local markets.105 Investor states, TNCs, and IFIs10 6
all have roles to play in ensuring that such investments truly deliver
benefits to local populations while shoring up food security in investor
96. Id.
97. Td. at 60-61.
98. Kenneth Roth, Rules on Corporate Ethics Could Help, Not Hinder, Multinationals, FIN.
TIMES (U.K.), June 21, 2005, at 19.
99. Td.
100. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Crisis into OpportunityV: Reinforcing
Multilateralism, f 21(a)-(b), presented to the 12th Session of the Hurnan Rights Council,
A/HRC/12/31 (July 21, 2009), available at http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/
officialreports/20090917 a-hrc-12-31_en.pdf.
101. Id. 21(c); see also THE WORLD BANK, supra note 55, at 17.
102. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 53, § 4.
103. Td.
104. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 100, 21(e).
105. Td. 21(h); see also Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 53, §§ 6, 8.
106. See supra Part III (discussing the World Bank's role in encouraging foreign investment
in agricultural production).
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countries. Here, adherence to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to
food's "Core Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights
Challenge" of large-scale land investments, and to the "Principles for
Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and
Resources," promulgated by the World Bank, among others, would prove
invaluable. 107
VII. CONCLUSION
Between 2008 and 2009, successive food and economic crises pushed an
additional one hundred million into poverty and raised the number of food
insecure by a staggering eleven percent.108 A crisis of such global
proportions has generated a largely uncoordinated response that by and
large still fails to hold global actors accountable. As commitments to
ensuring the right to food become more commonplace, the ability to
enforce these commitments or to reconcile them with global processes and
global actors remains relatively weak.
The current crisis reveals the shortcomings of the right to food as a
legal and normative framework for ensuring global food security. But it
also presents an opportunity to finally bring global actors within the
framework's purview. A rights-based approach-and its attendant
emphasis on the principles of transparency, participation, inclusion, and
accountability -is critical to effectively tackling today's hunger problems.
These principles must apply with equal force to all actors in the
international food system.
Normatively, one means of achieving this goal is to address the
extraterritorial obligations of states to respect and protect the right to food,
and to ensure that these obligations extend to states' relationships with IFIs
and TNCs. Though by no means exhaustive, addressing these doctrinal
challenges can begin to close the accountability gaps that undermine
effective implementation of the right to food and can give the food-
insecure greater control over the markets and resources that are essential to
meeting their food and livelihood needs.
107. See Special Rapporteur on the right to food, supra note 53; FAO ET AL., supra note 67.
108. FAO, supra note 1, at 4, 11.
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